R00210050000126 Approved For Release 2000/05/1 CLASSIFICATION SECRET CENTRAL INTELXIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. 25X1A2g TION REPORT DATE DISTR. 3 December 1948 COUNTRY China NO. OF PAGES 2 Sources of Labor Unrest in Shanghai SUBJECT Communist Strength in Shanghai 25X1A6a NO. OF ENCLS. PLACE ACQUIRED SUPPLEMENT TO DATE OF IN REPORT NO. 25X1X6



- Factors in the labor situation in Shanghai which make labor riots or revolt
 a possibility are:
 - a. The economic position of Shanghai workers is almost unbearable. Their wages have been frozen, and the salaries of textile workers, who constitute the majority of Shanghai labor, have been cut sixty per cent.
 - b. New regulations have resulted in the virtual disappearance of food from Shanchai markets. Even rationed rice is not available. Black market food prices are expressly high.
 - TU Yueh-sheng's activities are aimed at sebotaging the new economic regulations. TU's motive is revenge on CHIANG Ching-kuo for the arrest of TU's son and the resulting loss of face for TU.

Bonuses are payable at the end of January, on the occasion of the Chinese New Year. This is often a time of ill feeling in labor-management relations, and it is believed that the Communists may use this occasion as a signal for action.

e. There is further loss of confidence in the government as important cities continue to fall to the Communists.

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Comment. The significance of this labor unrest is that it could lead to burge of the present Nationalist government leaders and the establishment of coalition government for China. Such a coalition government would possibly include LI Chi-shen, but would not include Communists.

CHIANG Kai-shek's resignation is desired by all segments of Chinese society, but the Kuomintang cliques are not able to agree on a successor for him. Furthermore, it is doubtful if CHIANG will resign, or be forced to resign, until Nanking falls.

In the event of CHIANG's resignation, LI Tsung-jen would be the most popular choice to succeed him. LI, if in a position to form a government, would probably include in it HU Shih and the Kwangsi Clique. LI Chi-shen and TSAI Tingkai, South China dissident leaders, are neither influential nor highly regarded by LI Tsung-jen.)

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- 2. Communist strength among Shanghai workers is not great. Rather, such atrongth is centered among the student groups. It is estimated that seventy per cent of the students at Chiactung University are Communists.
- 3. A large proportion of the 6,000 refugees entoring Shanghai to date are probably Communists. In addition, bandit forces in the Shanghai area, numbering about 75,000, maintain contact with the Communists.

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